GAME THEORY AS A TOOL OF THE RISK-ORIENTED APPROACH OF THE FEDERAL TREASURY

Abstract

The article presents the author's methodology for selecting subjects of control for inclusion in the plan of control activities of the Federal Treasury, built on the basis of game theory, in which the process of determining the object of control for the formation of an activity plan for the Federal Treasury and the prevention of violations and shortcomings in the activities of government bodies and organizations, as well as the formation of a Risk Map can be described by a mathematical model of an antagonistic zero-sum game. A methodology for distributing funds allocated from the budget is proposed to ensure the most rational and efficient use of material, labor, time and financial resources of the Russian Treasury in the exercise of assigned powers to exercise internal state financial control. New tools of a risk-based approach are being tested that make it possible to level out the subjective factor in planning control activities, as a result of which risk-intensive control objects are not included in the field of view of the control body, or control objects with a low level of risk are included. As a result of the study, it was found that an antagonistic game with a missing saddle point makes it possible to consider more options for combining various objects of control when planning the activities of the Federal Treasury, as well as to increase the overall efficiency of the control body by reducing the risk of conditions for committing violations in the public sector.