INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION OF NATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORS TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE IN CONDITIONS OF SANCTION FRAGMENTATION AND GROWTH OF REGIONAL SETTLEMENT CIRCUITS

Abstract

The article analyzes the institutional restructuring of national financial regulators amid the accelerated transformation of the international financial architecture, where traditional mechanisms of global liquidity and settlements lose universality and are increasingly used as instruments of geo-economic pressure. It is shown that sanction fragmentation shifts regulatory priorities from minimizing transaction costs to ensuring payment security and settlement infrastructure sovereignty, creating dialectical tension between classical mandates of price and financial stability and the need for payment space autonomy. Drawing on a comparison of regulatory practices and financial indicator dynamics, the non-linear nature of de-dollarization in foreign trade settlements is revealed: shares of the dollar and euro sharply decline, while the use of the yuan, ruble, and other regional currencies grows, accompanied by a shortage of hedging instruments and heightened requirements for currency liquidity management. Special attention is given to the restructuring of correspondent banking networks and the formation of alternative financial messaging channels, which reduces dependence on traditional clearing centers but increases compliance burdens, payment return probabilities, transaction durations, and commission costs. It is argued that regulators expand their adaptation toolkit by combining currency controls, special legal regimes, and recalibration of prudential norms, while facing rising operational and sanctions-related legal risks alongside forced transparency reductions. A shift in reserve management toward gold and assets outside sanction coalition jurisdictions is traced, as is the acceleration of central bank digital currency projects positioned as technological frameworks for direct cross-border settlements. The conclusion posits the emergence of a segmented openness and financial regionalism model, where infrastructure resilience becomes a key competitiveness parameter, and further evolution leads to a polycentric system with new demands on regulators' competencies in platform interoperability and comprehensive risk management.